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The audit log: who changed what

Every change you, your API keys, our staff or our operations make to your account is recorded, in the same moment as the change: the change and its record are saved together or not at all, so there is no change without its record. Settings → Audit log shows them newest first (owners), and GET /v1/audit-events serves them to a program.

Not recorded yet, and listed here so that a missing row is never a surprise: the credit a top-up adds to your wallet when the payment settles (the top-up’s request is recorded, as wallet.top_up_requested), and the account’s pause for credit beginning or ending. Each will be added to this log, and to this page, when it is.

Not here, because nobody asked for it: what a pipeline does by its change policy on its own, such as adding a table it found or applying a schema change. Those are in the pipeline’s own history. What is here is the policy that chose them, each time someone sets it, and each answer someone gives to a change a table waited on.

  • Who: a person (by the address they had at the time), an API key (by its name), Reyansh operations (a command run by our operations team, always with a reason), Reyansh staff (by name, always with a reason), or Reyansh itself (a change nobody asked for, such as switching off a channel that kept failing).
  • How: app, api, operator, staff_console or system.
  • What: the action (below) and what it was done to, by its name at the time.
  • Before and after of each field it changed. A secret is never recorded: a credential’s value, a channel’s URL or signing secret appears as “changed”, never as its value. A change too large to keep in full (over 8 KB) names its fields and is marked truncated.
  • The request that made it (request_id, the id our support asks you for), and for owners signed in as people, the address and browser it came from.

Owners, in Settings → Audit log, and an API key (read or full) through the API, for your own security tooling. Addresses and browsers are shown only to an owner signed in as a person: never to an API key, never in a key’s CSV. A member does not read the audit log; a pipeline’s History tab shows the changes people made to it (Show › Changes people made) to everyone who can see the pipeline.

GET /v1/audit-events takes actor (a person’s id, a key’s apk_ id), action (a prefix: pipeline. for every pipeline change), target, pipeline_id, from and to (RFC 3339; at most 366 days apart, 422 range_too_large beyond), and pages with cursor and limit.

GET /v1/audit-events.csv (and Download as CSV in Settings) is the same filtered range as a file, at most 200,000 rows. The download is itself recorded (audit_log.exported), before any row is sent. A cell that begins with =, +, -, @, a tab or a carriage return is prefixed with ', so a spreadsheet never runs a name someone typed as a formula. A download started by a link or a page on another site is refused (403 cross_site_request): start it from Settings, or call it with a key. If the download fails part way, it fails as a broken download, never as a shorter file that looks complete: download it again. Every row saved before the download began is in it exactly once.

Under Download as CSV, an account whose API keys are on is linked to the history export (Platform export), which copies the audit log, without addresses or browsers, with the account’s other history, into a PostgreSQL database you own, once a day.

Every row is kept for as long as the account exists, and shown 366 days at a time. The address and browser are cleared from each row 365 days after it, the rest of the row kept.

A member of Reyansh staff gives a reason (support, an incident, billing, a security review, and a note) before opening your account in our staff console, and the row shows their name and that reason. A command our operations team runs against your account, such as granting credit, is recorded with the reason it was given.

Changes made through the app and the API:

action when fields
pipeline.created a pipeline was created source_id, destination_id, tables, schedule
pipeline.deleted a pipeline was deleted
pipeline.started a pipeline was asked to run
pipeline.stopped a pipeline was asked to stop
pipeline.schedule_changed its schedule changed schedule
pipeline.discarded_rows_changed what happens to rows the destination discards changed on_discarded_row, on_rejected_value, record_in_destination
pipeline.notifications_changed it was muted or unmuted muted, until
pipeline.alert_thresholds_changed its alert thresholds changed grace_minutes, source_log_percent, source_log_bytes, stall_minutes, freshness_minutes
pipeline.source_cleanup_acknowledged a deleted pipeline’s source clean-up was said to be done
pipeline.change_policy_changed the pipeline’s answers to schema changes were set rules (each answer that changed, before and after), confirmed (the kinds whose copy-again answer is confirmed)
pipeline.source_history_accepted a person accepted a changed source history, and the pipeline was started system_id, from_timeline, to_timeline, switch_point, checkpoint
table.added tables were added to a pipeline tables
table.removed a table was removed
table.recopy_requested a table was asked to be copied again delete_rows_not_in_source
table.verify_requested a table’s row counts were asked to be verified, source against destination
table.resumed a parked table was resumed
table.sync_mode_requested a change of the mode a table is kept in was asked for mode (before and after)
table.sync_mode_request_cancelled a waiting change of a table’s mode was cancelled mode
table.purge_requested a table’s rows marked deleted were asked to be deleted
table.purge_request_cancelled a waiting purge of a table’s rows marked deleted was cancelled
pipeline.sync_mode_default_changed the mode a table added later is kept in was set default (before and after)
pipeline.resync_requested tables, or every table, were asked to be copied again scope, tables, intent, slot_name_changed, publication_name_changed, repair (the defect, for a repair re-sync an operator asked for; it is not charged)
pipeline.sync_requested Sync now was pressed effect
table.change_policy_changed one table’s own answers to schema changes were set, or cleared rules, confirmed
table.change_decided a resume answered the schema changes a table waited on answers (each change’s id, its kind and the answer given)
table.column_settings_changed how a table’s columns are synced was set (Sync, Block or Hash) columns (each changed column’s name, its treatment and the answer about its existing values)
table.filter_changed a table’s row filter was set, changed or removed, or a pending one answered conditions (how many), match, recopy (whether the table is copied again), rows_outside (keep or delete, on a PostgreSQL destination); never a value of the filter
source.created a source was created name, kind, credential_ref
destination.created a destination was created name, kind, credential_ref
destination.hash_salt_revealed an owner read the destination’s hash salt (a read that is recorded)
destination.hash_salt_set an owner set the destination’s hash salt, before any column was hashed with it (never the salt)
destination.hash_salt_previewed an owner asked the hash a sample value would get (never the value or its hash)
destination.edited a Snowflake destination’s settings were edited warehouse, role, user, credential_ref (each before and after, only those that changed; the credential by its reference, never its key)
source.edited a PostgreSQL source’s connection was edited (PATCH /v1/sources/{id}) fields (the names of the connection’s fields that changed: host, port, user, password, tls.mode, tls.trust, tls.ca_pem; never a value), password (recorded as changed, never its value)
source.trust_revoked an approved certificate was removed from a PostgreSQL source (POST /v1/sources/{id}/revoke-trust); its pipelines restart and stop at the TLS step until a new approval kind (tls_certificate), fingerprint (the certificate’s SHA-256: public, never a secret)
ssh_key.created the account was given an SSH key for reaching a database through a bastion (POST /v1/ssh-keys) fingerprint (the key’s SHA256: fingerprint: public, never the private half)
ssh_key.retired an SSH key was retired: its private half deleted, its record kept (POST /v1/ssh-keys/{id}/retire) fingerprint
agent.created a proxy agent was created, awaiting enrollment (POST /v1/agents) name (never its enrollment token, not even a hint)
agent.key_approved a member approved the key a proxy agent enrolled, naming its fingerprint (POST /v1/agents/{id}/approve) fingerprint (the key’s SHA256: fingerprint: public)
agent.replaced a second connection under one proxy agent’s identity replaced the first, which was closed; recorded by the system address (where it connected from), previous (where the closed connection was from)
agent.duplicated a proxy agent was replaced three times within ten minutes: two copies of it are running, or its key file was copied; recorded by the system, once per burst replacements
agent.deleted a proxy agent was deleted: its key and token burned, its connection closed, its record kept (DELETE /v1/agents/{id}) name
credential.created a credential was stored shape; value as changed, never valued
credential.rotated a credential was rotated value as changed, never valued; for a PostgreSQL connection string a pipeline uses, identity_recorded: each destination or source whose database the rotation recorded, that database (a cluster’s id and a database name), and confirmed (true when your confirm asserted it was the same database, which nothing could prove)
credential.pending_key_generated a key pair’s rotation made its pending key; the key in use changes only at the switch, which is a rotation pending_key as changed, never valued
connection.tested a connection test ran, or a stored destination’s own test (POST /v1/destinations/{id}/test) outcome (passed, failed, or unanswered: usable, with a step that got no answer, which is never a pass), tested (connection for the connection test, destination for a destination tested on its own), kind (the source’s for the connection test; the destination’s for its own test, which has no source)
notification_channel.created a notification channel was added name, kind, the switches, pipelines, triggers; url and signing_secret as changed
notification_channel.updated a channel was changed name, the switches, enabled, pipelines, triggers; url as changed
notification_channel.deleted a channel was deleted
notification_channel.secret_rotated a channel’s signing secret was rotated signing_secret as changed, overlap_hours, drop_previous
notification_channel.tested a test was sent to a channel trigger
notification_channel.disabled we switched off a channel that answered 410 or kept failing why
notification_settings.changed the account’s notification email changed email_to, errors, warnings, recoveries, triggers
notification_settings.tested a test email was sent trigger
notification.resent a notification was sent again scope
me.notifications_changed a person changed their own notification email pipelines, errors, warnings
session.signed_in a person signed in method (sso for single sign-on; absent for an email link), recovery
session.switched a person switched to this account from another of theirs (which is not named) recovery (a recovery owner switching into an account that requires single sign-on)
session.signed_out a person signed out
wallet.top_up_requested a top-up was asked for amount_minor, currency
wallet.credit_granted our operations granted credit, with the reason amount_minor, key
wallet.alerts_changed an owner changed the money alerts or the monthly budget low_balance_days, low_balance_minor, monthly_budget_minor, budget_action
audit_log.exported the audit log was downloaded as CSV from, to, filter, rows
account.viewed a member of our staff opened this account’s details, with the reason
sso.draft_tested an owner’s test sign-in finished outcome (passed or refused), code (the refusal’s reason)
sso.identity_linked a person’s identity at the identity provider was linked to them, at once or after their mailbox confirmed it issuer, confirmed_by_email
sso.identity_mismatch a sign-in came from a different identity for a linked address, or a linked identity with a new address, and was refused; every owner is told, with whose single sign-on to unlink if it was expected issuer, linked_to (the people whose links refused it)
sso.link_confirmation_sent a sign-in needed the person’s mailbox to confirm it owner_invitation
sso.remembered_identity_changed a remembered browser’s sign-in came back as a different person, and was refused
sso.link_denied a person answered “No, it wasn’t me” to a confirmation code emailed to them; every owner is told host (the identity provider the confirmation named), owner_invitation
sso.link_confirmation_expired nobody entered a confirmation code within its 15 minutes (no one is told)
sso.identity_unlinked an owner unlinked a person’s identity at the identity provider; the sessions made through it ended, and the person links again at their next single sign-on (one row per identity) issuer, sessions_revoked
sso.mode_changed single sign-on was turned off, allowed or required, by an owner (or, with a reason, by our staff when every recovery owner was gone); a switch to required ends the email-link sessions of everyone but the recovery owners; every owner is told how many people that signed out mode, sessions_revoked, people_signed_out, recovery_sessions_kept
sso.jit_changed an owner changed whether people at the verified domains may join as members on their first single sign-on jit
sso.recovery_owners_changed an owner changed who may still sign in by email link while single sign-on is required recovery_owners
sso.domain_added an owner added a domain; it is pending until its DNS record is found domain
sso.domain_verified an owner’s check found a domain’s DNS record, and the domain is verified (again, when it had lapsed) domain
sso.domain_missing the daily check did not find a verified domain’s DNS record, the first day in a row; every owner is told domain
sso.domain_lapsed a verified domain’s DNS record was missing for 14 days in a row, and the domain lapsed: people at it can no longer join or find the account’s sign-in by their address; members already in are unaffected; every owner is told domain
sso.domain_removed an owner removed a domain domain
sso.client_secret_expiring the daily check found that the client secret of the live single sign-on connection expires within 30, 7 or 1 days (the expiry date an owner gave when saving it), or has expired: the date, the threshold, the identity provider, its host and the single sign-on mode then; every owner is told expires_on, threshold, idp, host, mode
sso.connection_created an owner began setting up single sign-on, choosing the protocol and the identity provider; it stays off, and signs nobody in, until a draft is saved, tested and applied protocol, idp
sso.draft_saved an owner saved the identity provider’s details as a draft; it signs nobody in until it is tested and applied issuer, client_id, client_secret (recorded as changed, never shown), client_secret_expires_on
sso.draft_discarded an owner discarded the draft; the live version is unchanged issuer
sso.version_applied an owner made a tested draft the live version; with a new identity provider, everyone signed in through the old one is signed out (the applying owner too, if they were), everyone linked to it links again at their next sign-in, and the browsers it remembered are forgotten source, issuer, people_relinking, browsers_forgotten, sessions_revoked
sso.connection_deleted an owner deleted the single sign-on connection, which was off, and its versions, domains, linked identities and recovery owners with it

Read from the account’s two other trails, people and keys (the same rows Settings → Members and API keys show):

action when fields
invitation.created someone was invited role
invitation.resent an invitation was sent again
invitation.revoked an owner withdrew an invitation
invitation.withdrawn an invitation was withdrawn because its inviter lost an owner’s access
invitation.declined an invitation was declined
invitation.accepted someone joined role
member.role_changed a person’s role changed role
member.removed a person was removed role
member.left a person left role
member.joined_by_sso someone at a verified domain joined as a member through single sign-on role
api_key.created an API key was created scope
api_key.rolled an API key was rolled scope
api_key.revoked an API key was revoked scope
api_key.exposed an API key was sent where it must not be, and refused scope